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Energy-Efficient Resource Allocation in Wireless
Networks: An overview of game-theoretic
approaches
Farhad Meshkati, H. Vincent Poor, and Stuart C. Schwartz
Abstract
An overview of game-theoretic approaches to energy-efficient resource allocation in wireless networks is pre-
sented. Focusing on multiple-access networks, it is demonstrated that game theory can be used as an effective tool to
study resource allocation in wireless networks with quality-of-service (QoS) constraints. A family of non-cooperative
(distributed) games is presented in which each user seeks to choose a strategy that maximizes its own utility while
satisfying its QoS requirements. The utility function considered here measures the number of reliable bits that are
transmitted per joule of energy consumed and, hence, is particulary suitable for energy-constrained networks. The
actions available to each user in trying to maximize its own utility are at least the choice of the transmit power
and, depending on the situation, the user may also be able to choose its transmission rate, modulation, packet size,
multiuser receiver, multi-antenna processing algorithm, or carrier allocation strategy. The best-response strategy and
Nash equilibrium for each game is presented. Using this game-theoretic framework, the effects of power control,
rate control, modulation, temporal and spatial signal processing, carrier allocation strategy and delay QoS constraints
on energy efficiency and network capacity are quantified.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
Future wireless networks are expected to support a variety of services with diverse quality-of-service (QoS)
requirements. For example, a mixture of delay-sensitive applications (e.g., voice and video teleconferencing) and
delay-tolerant ones (e.g., web browsing and file downloading) must be supported. Given that the two principal
wireless network resources, i.e., bandwidth and energy, are scarce, the main challenge in designing wireless networks
is to use network resources as efficiently as possible while providing the QoS required by the users.
Game-theoretic approaches to radio resource allocation have recently attracted much attention and will be the
focus of this article. We will show that game theory can be used as a unifying framework to study radio resource
management in a variety of wireless networks with different service criteria. Our focus will be on infrastructure
networks where users transmit to a common concentration point such as a base station in a cellular network or an
access point. Since most of the terminals in a wireless network are battery-powered, energy efficiency is crucial
to prolonging the life of the terminals. Also, in most practical scenarios, distributed algorithms are preferred over
centralized ones. Centralized algorithms tend to be complex and not easily scalable. Therefore, throughout this
article, we focus on distributed algorithms with emphasis on energy efficiency. Using a game-theoretic framework,
we demonstrate the impact of advanced signal processing on energy efficiency and network capacity. The tradeoffs
among throughput, delay, network capacity and energy efficiency are also discussed. The ideas presented in this
paper can also be applied to wireless ad hoc networks, however, the topic is beyond the scope of this article (see
[1] for applications of game theory to ad hoc networks).
It should be noted that, recently, tools from optimization theory have also been employed to study resource
allocation in wireless networks using the network utility maximization framework proposed in [2] (see for example
[3]). While there is considerable overlap between the game-theoretic and optimization-theoretic approaches, game
theory tends to focus on the multiuser competitive nature of the problem and on the users’ interaction.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe how game theory can be used for studying
radio resource management in wireless networks. The choice of the utility function is discussed in Section III. In
Section IV, we present a family of power control games for energy-efficient resource allocation in wireless CDMA
networks. Finally, discussions and conclusions are given in Section V.
3II. GAME THEORY FOR RADIO RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
Game theory is a mathematical tool for analyzing the interaction of two or more decision makers. Game theory
has been used in a variety of fields such as economics, political science, and biology [4]. A (strategic) game
consists of three components: a set of players, the strategy set for each player and a utility (payoff) function for
each player measuring the degree of “happiness” of the player [5]. Recently, game theory has also been used in
telecommunications and particularly wireless communications (see for example [6]–[9]). The users’ interaction in
a wireless network can be modeled as a game in which the users’ terminals are the players in the game competing
for network resources (i.e., bandwidth and energy). Any action taken by a user affects the performance of other
users in the network. Game theory is the natural tool for studying this interaction.
Since our focus in this article is on distributed schemes, we will concentrate on non-cooperative games. Let
G = [K, {Ak}, uk] represent a game where K = {1, · · · ,K} is the set of players/users, Ak is the set of actions
(strategies) available to user k, and uk is the utility (payoff) function for user k. In a non-cooperative game, each
user seeks to choose its strategy in such a way as to maximize its own utility, i.e.,
max
ak∈Ak
uk for k = 1, · · · ,K. (1)
For such a game, we first need to define two important concepts, namely, a Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimality
[5].
Definition 2.1: A Nash equilibrium (NE) is a set of strategies, (a∗1, · · · , a∗K), such that no user can unilaterally
improve its own utility, that is,
uk(a
∗
k, a
∗
−k) ≥ uk(ak, a
∗
−k) for all ak ∈ Ak and k = 1, · · · ,K, (2)
where a∗−k = (a∗1, · · · , a∗k−1, a∗k+1, · · · , a∗K).
A Nash equilibrium is a stable outcome of G. At NE, no user has any incentive to change its strategy.
Definition 2.2: A set of strategies, (a˜1, · · · , a˜K) is Pareto-optimal if there exists no other set of strategies for
which one or more users can improve their utilities without reducing the utilities of other users
It should be noted that our focus throughout this paper is on pure strategies. However, one could also allow for
the users to have mixed strategies. In such a case, each user assigns a probability distribution to its pure strategies
and then it chooses a pure strategy based on the probability distribution. A non-cooperative game may have no
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, one equilibrium or multiple equilibria. Also, in many cases, a NE may not be
Pareto-efficient (Pareto-optimal).
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Fig. 1. The matrix-form representation of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
As an example, consider the following two-player game called the Prisoner’s Dilemma [4]. The two players
are two prisoners that have been arrested for a joint crime. They are taken into separate rooms and are given the
options to either confess (C) to the crime or not confess (NC). Each prisoner is told that if they both confess, each
gets a light sentence (i.e., payoff of −1). If neither confesses, both will go free (i.e., payoff of 0). If one of them
confesses and the other one does not, the confessor will get a reward (i.e., payoff of +1) and the other prisoner
will get a heavy sentence (i.e., payoff of −2). The actions and the corresponding payoffs of the players are shown
in Fig. 1. Since the two prisoners are in separate rooms and hence are not able to cooperate, the payoff-maximizing
selfish strategy for each of them is to confess. It can easily be verified that (C,C) is the unique Nash equilibrium of
this game. Furthermore, this equilibrium is not Pareto-efficient since choosing (NC,NC) would result in a larger
payoff for both players. However, this would require cooperation between the two prisoners. Hence, it is evident
from this example that there is a clear conflict between individual rationality and social welfare.
In this article, we provide an overview of game-theoretic approaches to energy-efficient resource allocation in
wireless networks. Consider the uplink of a direct-sequence code-division multiple-access (DS-CDMA) network
where each user wishes to locally and selfishly choose its action in such a way as to maximize its own utility while
satisfying its QoS requirements. Depending on the situation, the actions open to each user in trying to maximize its
own utility can be, for example, the choice of its transmit power, transmission rate, modulation, packet size, multiuser
receiver, multi-antenna processing algorithm, or carrier allocation strategy. The strategy chosen by a user affects
the performance of other users in the network through multiple-access interference. There are several important
questions to ask regarding game G. First of all, what is a reasonable choice of utility function? Secondly, given the
utility function, what strategy must a user choose in order to maximize its own utility (i.e., best-response strategy)?
If every user in the network selfishly and locally picks its best-response strategy, will there be a steady-state solution
where no user can unilaterally improve its utility (i.e., Nash equilibrium)? If such a steady-state solution exits, is
5it unique? How does the performance of such a non-cooperative approach compare with a cooperative scheme?
Let us consider the uplink of a synchronous DS-CDMA network with K users.1 Assuming quasi-static fading,
the signal received by the uplink receiver (after chip-matched filtering) sampled at the chip rate over one symbol
duration can be expressed as
r =
K∑
k=1
√
pkhk bksk +w, (3)
where pk, hk, bk and sk are the transmit power, channel gain, transmitted bit and spreading sequence of user k,
respectively, and w is the noise vector which include other-cell interference and is assumed to be Gaussian with
mean 0 and covariance σ2I. Throughout this article, we study distributed resource allocation in such a wireless
network by presenting several (non-cooperative) power control games in which users choose their strategies in such
a way as to maximize their utilities. The emphasis will be mainly on energy efficiency. It should be noted that in
the power control games under consideration, the actions available to the users are not limited to the choice of
transmit power. Depending on the situation, the users may also choose their transmission rates, modulation schemes,
packet sizes, multiuser receivers, multi-antenna processing algorithms, or carrier allocation strategies. Furthermore,
cross-layer resource allocation can be achieved by expanding the strategy sets of the users over multiple layers in
the OSI protocol stack or by defining the users’ utility functions such that performance measures across multiple
layers are included.
III. UTILITY FUNCTION
Based on the discussions in the previous section, the choice of the utility function has a great impact on the
nature of the game and how the users choose their actions. For resource allocation in wireless data networks, several
different utility functions have been used in the literature.
When maximizing the spectral efficiency is the main goal, it is common to define the user’s utility as a logarithmic,
concave function of the user’s signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SIR) [10], [11], i.e.,
uk = ζk log(1 + γk), (4)
where γk is the SIR for user k, and ζk is a constant which is in general user-dependent. This utility function is
proportional to the Shannon capacity for the user treating all interference as white Gaussian noise. In addition,
1For the sake of simplicity, it is common to focus on a synchronous CDMA system. Many of the results presented in this paper can be
generalized to asynchronous systems as well.
6a pricing function is introduced to prevent the users from always transmitting at full power. In many cases, the
pricing function is assumed to be linear in the user’s transmit power. Hence, the net utility for user k is given by
u˜k = ζk log(1 + γk)− ckpk (5)
where ck is the pricing factor for user k.
The authors in [12] define the utility function of a user to be a sigmoidal function of the user’s SIR.2 In this
case, the net utility is defined as the difference between the user’s utility function and a (linear) cost function, i.e.,
u˜k = uk − ckpk (6)
where, ck is again the pricing factor and uk is assumed to be a sigmoidal function of γk.
In [13], the authors define a cost function (instead of a utility function) and consider a game in which each user
chooses its transmit power to minimize its own cost. The cost function for user k is defined as
Jk = bkpk + ck(γ
tar
k − γk)
2, (7)
where bk and ck are non-negative constants and γtark is the target SIR for user k. Note that this cost function is
convex and non-negative. Therefore, it has a non-negative minimum.
When energy efficiency is the main concern, a good choice for the utility function is one that measures the
number of bits that can be transmitted per joule of energy consumed. It is clear that a higher SIR level at the
output of the receiver will result in a lower bit error rate and hence higher throughput. However, achieving a high
SIR level often requires the user terminal to transmit at a high power which in turn results in low battery life.
This tradeoff can be captured by defining the utility function of a user as the ratio of its throughput to its transmit
power, i.e.,
uk =
Tk
pk
. (8)
Throughput here is the net number of information bits that are transmitted without error per unit time (this sometimes
is referred to as goodput). It can be expressed as
Tk = Rkf(γk), (9)
where Rk and γk are the transmission rate and the SIR for the kth user, respectively; and f(γk) is the “efficiency
function” which represents the packet success rate (PSR). The assumption here is that if a packet has one or more
2An increasing function is S-shaped if there is a point above which the function is strictly concave, and below which the function is
strictly convex.
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Fig. 2. User’s utility as a function of transmit power for fixed interference.
bit errors, it will be retransmitted. This utility function, which has units of bits/joule, represents the total number
of reliable bits that are delivered to the destination per joule of energy consumed. It captures very well the tradeoff
between throughput and battery life and is particularly suitable for applications where energy efficiency is more
important than achieving a high throughput. The utility function in (8) was introduced in [14], [15] and has been
used by others in scenarios in which energy efficiency is the main concern (see for example, [16]–[18]). Obviously,
f(γ) depends on the details of the data transmission such as modulation, coding, and packet size. However, in
most practical cases, f(γ) is increasing and S-shaped (sigmoidal) with f(∞) = 1. It is also required for f(γ) to
be equal to zero when γ = 0 to make sure that the utility function in (8) does not become infinity when pk = 0
(see [18] for details). Combining (8) with (9), the utility function of the kth user is given by
uk = Rk
f(γk)
pk
. (10)
Using a sigmoidal efficiency function, the shape of the utility function in (10) is shown in Fig. 2 as a function of
the user’s transmit power keeping other users’ transmit powers fixed. The utility function in (10) can also be used
for coded systems by modifying the efficiency function, f(γ), to represent the PSR for the coded system and also
scaling the transmission rate appropriately to count only the information bits in a packet.
IV. POWER CONTROL GAMES
Power control is used for interference management and resource allocation in wireless networks, especially
CDMA networks. In the uplink (from the mobile terminal to the base station), the purpose of power control is for
8each user to transmit just enough power to achieve the required QoS without causing excessive interference in the
network. Power control for CDMA systems has been studied extensively over the past decade (see for example
[19]–[25]). The conventional approach has been to model power control as a constrained optimization problem
where the total transmit power is minimized under the constraint that the users’ QoS requirements are satisfied.
The QoS requirement for a user is usually expressed as a lower bound on the user’s output SIR. In [20], the authors
propose a distributed algorithm for reaching the optimum power levels. In [21], a unified framework for distributed
power control in cellular networks is proposed. Alternatively, the transmit powers of the users can be chosen in such
a way as to maximize the spectral efficiency (in bits/s/Hz). In this approach, the optimal power control strategy is
essentially a water-filling scheme (see [23]). In [25], the authors use tools from geometric programming to study
power control.
Recently, game theory has been used to study power control in CDMA systems (see, for example, [10]–[12],
[14]–[17], [26]–[30]). Each user seeks to choose its transmit power in order to maximize its utility. As mentioned in
Section III, the choice of the utility has a great impact on the nature of the game and the resulting Nash equilibrium.
In [10] and [11], the utility function in (5) is chosen for the users and the corresponding Nash equilibrium solution
is derived. In [14] and [15], the authors use the utility function in (8) and show that the resulting Nash equilibrium
is SIR-balanced (i.e., all users have the same output SIR). The analysis is extended in [17] by introducing pricing
to improve the efficiency of Nash equilibrium. Joint network-centric and user-centric power control is discussed in
[28]. In [29], the utility function is assumed to be proportional to the user’s throughput and a pricing function based
on the normalized received power of the user is proposed. S-modular power control games are studied in [30]. In
particular, the conditions for existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium for an S-modular game are discussed,
and convergence of best-response algorithms is studied.
In this section, we discuss a family of non-cooperative power control games for resource allocation in a variety of
CDMA networks with emphasis on energy efficiency. In all these games, the utility function measures the number
of reliable bits that are transmitted per joule of energy consumed (similar to the utility function given in (10)). We
discuss power control games in which, in addition to choosing their transmit powers and depending on the scenario,
the users can choose their uplink receivers, MIMO processing algorithms, modulation schemes, transmission rates,
and carrier allocation strategies. We also discuss the cases where the users seek to maximize their energy efficiency
while satisfying their delay QoS constraints.
Our focus throughout this paper is on non-cooperative (distributed) games where each user seeks to maximize
9its own utility. An alternative approach would be to maximize the sum of the users’ utilities. The solution to this
problem would correspond to a point on the Parteo-optimal frontier. However, obtaining a closed-form solution
for such an optimization problem is usually very difficult. In addition, the solution typically requires coordination
among users and, hence, is not scalable.
A. Energy-Efficient Power Control
In [14] and [15], a non-cooperative game is proposed in which each user chooses its transmit power in such a way
as to maximize its own energy efficiency (measured in bits/joule). To be more specific, let G = [K, {Ak}, {uk}]
denote a non-cooperative game where K = {1, ...,K}, and Ak = [0, Pmax] is the strategy set for the kth user.
Here, Pmax is the maximum allowed power for transmission. For this game, the best-response strategy for user k
is given by the solution of the following maximization problem:
max
pk
uk = max
pk
Rk
f(γk)
pk
for k = 1, ...,K. (11)
Recall that with random spreading, the output SIR for a matched filter receiver is given by
γk =
pkhk
σ2 + 1
N
∑
j 6=k pjhj
. (12)
Assuming a matched filter receiver, it is shown in [15] that the user’s utility is maximized when the user transmits
at a power level that achieves an SIR equal to γ∗ at the output of the receiver, where γ∗ is the unique (positive)
solution of
f(γ) = γ f ′(γ) . (13)
It should be noted that, based on (13), γ∗ depends only on the physical-layer characteristics of the communication
such as modulation, coding and packet size. If γ∗ is not feasible for a user, the user’s utility is maximized when
the user transmits at the maximum power. Furthermore, it is shown in [14] and [17] that this game has a unique
Nash equilibrium and the equilibrium is SIR-balanced, i.e, all users have the same SIR. The existence of a Nash
equilibrium is due to the quasiconcavity of the utility as a function of the user’s transmit power.3 The uniqueness
of the equilibrium is because of the uniqueness of γ∗ and the one-to-one correspondence between the users’ output
SIRs and transmit powers.
3The function u defined on a convex set S is quasiconcave if every superlevel set of u is convex, i.e., {x ∈ S|u(x) ≥ a} is convex for
every value of a. In other words, a function is quasiconcave if there exists a point below which the function is non-decreasing, and above
which the function is non-increasing.
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The analysis is further extended in [17] to show that this SIR-balancing NE solution is not Pareto-optimal. In
particular, it is shown that if all the users reduce their transmit powers at the same time, the utility will improve
for every user. Based on this observation, the authors introduce a linear pricing function and define the net utility
of a user as
u˜k = Rk
f(γk)
pk
− ckpk for k = 1, ...,K, (14)
where ck is the pricing factor. This utility function encourages users to transmit at a lower power level which causes
less interference for other users. A new game is proposed in which users maximize their net utilities given in (14).
It is shown in [17] that the Nash equilibrium for this game Pareto-dominates the SIR-balancing solution.
B. Joint Power Control and Receiver Design
The cross-layer problem of joint power control and receiver design is studied in [18]. It is shown that for all
linear receivers, the non-cooperative power control game in which each user maximizes its own utility (energy
efficiency) has a unique Nash equilibrium. The equilibrium is again SIR-balanced. The target SIR is the solution of
(13) and is independent of the receiver type. The results are extended to multi-antenna systems as well. Using this
non-cooperative game-theoretic framework, the gains in energy efficiency and network capacity due to sophisticated
temporal and spatial signal processing (i.e., multiuser detection and multi-antenna processing) are quantified. In
particular, using a large-system analysis similar to that presented in [31], it can be shown that, for the matched
filter (MF), the decorrelator (DE) and the linear MMSE receiver, user k’s utility at Nash equilibrium is given by
uk =
Rkf(γ
∗)h¯k
γ∗σ2
Γ¯ , (15)
where Γ¯ depends on the receiver:
Γ¯MF = 1− α¯γ∗ for α¯ < 1
γ∗
, (16)
Γ¯DE = 1− α for α < 1 , (17)
and Γ¯MMSE = 1− α¯ γ
∗
1 + γ∗
for α¯ < 1 + 1
γ∗
, (18)
with α¯ = α
m
and h¯k =
∑m
l=1 hkl. Here, α is the system load which is defined as the ratio of the number of users
to the processing gain (i.e., number of users per degree of freedom), m is the number of recieved antennas and
hkl is the channel gain from the transmit antenna of the kth user to the lth recieve antenna. σ2 is the noise power
which includes other-cell interference.
11
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Fig. 3. Average utility vs. load for the matched filter (MF), the decorrelator (DE), and the MMSE receiver with one and two receive
antennas.
Fig. 3 shows the average utility as a function of the system load for one and two receive antennas for a Rayleigh
channel for a user which is 100 meters away from the uplink receiver. The figure shows the achieved utilities for
the matched filter (MF), the decorrelator (DE) and the linear MMSE receiver. The dashed lines correspond to single
receive antenna case (m = 1) and the solid lines represent the case of two receive antennas (m = 2). It is seen
from the figure that the utility (energy efficiency) improves considerably when the matched filter is replaced by a
multiuser detector. Also, the system capacity (i.e., the maximum number of users that can be accommodated by
the system) is larger for the multiuser receivers as compared with the matched filter. Among all linear receivers,
the MMSE detector achieves the highest utility. In addition, significant improvements in user utility and system
capacity are observed when two receive antennas are used compared to the single antenna case. The improvement
is more significant for the matched filter and the MMSE receiver as compared with the decorrelating detector. This
is because the matched filter and the MMSE receiver benefit from both power pooling and interference reduction
whereas the decorrelating detector benefits only from power pooling (see [32]).
Fig. 4 shows the average utility of a user as a function of the system load for the matched filter, decorrelator
and MMSE receivers. The solid and dashed lines correspond to the non-cooperative and Pareto-optimal solutions,
respectively. While the difference between the non-cooperative approach and the cooperative solution is significant
for the matched filter, the solutions are identical for the decorrelator and are quite close to each other for the
MMSE receiver. The reason is that multiuser detectors do a better job of decoupling the users as compared to the
12
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Fig. 4. Average utility vs load for the matched filter (MF), the decorrelator (DE), and the MMSE receiver (single receive antenna).
conventional matched filter.
C. Power Control for Multicarrier CDMA
It is well known that for maximizing the throughput, the optimal power allocation strategy in a single-user system
with parallel AWGN channels is waterfilling [33]. The multiuser scenario is more complicated. In [34]–[36], for
example, several waterfilling-type approaches have been investigated for multiuser systems to maximize the overall
throughput. However, there are many practical situations where enhancing energy efficiency is more important
than maximizing throughput. For such applications, it is more important to maximize the number of bits that can
be transmitted per joule of energy consumed rather than to maximize the throughput. Focusing on a multicarrier
DS-CDMA system with D carriers, let us consider a non-cooperative game in which each user chooses how much
power to transmit on each carrier to maximize its overall energy efficiency. Let GD = [K, {AMCk }, {uMCk }] denote
the proposed non-cooperative game where K = {1, · · · ,K}, and AMCk = [0, Pmax]D is the strategy set for the
kth user. Here, Pmax is the maximum transmit power on each carrier. Each strategy in AMCk can be written as
pk = [pk1, · · · , pkD] where pkℓ is the transmit power of user k on the ℓth carrier. The utility function for user k is
defined as the ratio of the total throughput to the total transmit power for the D carriers, i.e.,
uMCk =
∑D
ℓ=1 Tkℓ∑D
ℓ=1 pkℓ
, (19)
13
where Tkℓ is the throughput achieved by user k over the ℓth carrier, and is given by Tkℓ = Rkf(γkℓ) with γkℓ
denoting the received SIR for user k on carrier ℓ. Hence, the utility-maximizing strategy for a user is given by the
solution of
max
pk
uMCk = max
pk1,··· ,pkD
∑D
ℓ=1 Tkℓ∑D
ℓ=1 pkℓ
for k = 1, · · · ,K, (20)
under the constraint of non-negative powers (i.e., pkℓ ≥ 0 for all k = 1, · · · ,K and ℓ = 1, · · · ,D). The multi-
dimensional nature of users’ strategies and non-quasiconcavity of the utility function makes the multicarrier problem
much more challenging than the single-carrier case.
It is shown in [37] that, for all linear receivers and with all other users’ transmit powers being fixed, user k’s
utility function, given by (19), is maximized when
pkℓ =


p∗kLk for ℓ = Lk
0 for ℓ 6= Lk
, (21)
where Lk = argminℓ p∗kℓ with p∗kℓ being the transmit power required by user k to achieve an SIR equal to γ∗ on
the ℓth carrier, or Pmax if γ∗ cannot be achieved. Here, γ∗ is the again the solution of f(γ) = γ f ′(γ).
This suggests that the utility for user k is maximized when the user transmits only over its “best” carrier such
that the achieved SIR at the output of the uplink receiver is equal to γ∗. The “best” carrier is the one that requires
the least amount of transmit power to achieve γ∗ at the output of the receiver. This solution is different from the
waterfilling solution that is obtained when maximizing simply throughput [38]. Depending on the channel gains,
the multicarrier power control game may have no equilibrium, a unique equilibrium, or more than one equilibrium
(see [37]). Furthermore, with a high probability, at Nash equilibrium the users are evenly distributed among the
carriers. It is also shown that the best-response greedy algorithm in which each user iteratively and distributively
maximizes its own utility converges to the Nash equilibrium (when it exists).
Fig. 5 compares the approach of joint maximization of utility over all carriers with an approach in which the
user’s utility is maximized over each carrier independently. A significant improvement in the utility is achieved
when joint maximization over all carriers is used. This is because in the joint optimization approach, each user
transmits only on its “best” carrier. This way, the users perform a distributed interference avoidance mechanism
which results in a higher overall utility.
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Fig. 5. Total utility vs. number of users, K, for the two-carrier case with processing gain equal to 128.
D. Joint Power and Rate Control with Delay QoS Constraints
Tradeoffs between energy efficiency and delay have recently gained considerable attention. The tradeoffs in the
single-user case are studied in [39]–[42]. The multiuser problem in turn is considered in [43] and [44]. In [43],
the authors present a centralized scheduling scheme to transmit the arriving packets within a specific time interval
such that the total energy consumed is minimized whereas in [44], a distributed ALOHA-type scheme is proposed
for achieving energy-delay tradeoffs. The energy-delay tradeoff for CDMA networks is analyzed in [45] and [46]
using a game-theoretic framework.
Consider a non-cooperative game in which each user seeks to choose its transmit power and transmission rate to
maximize its energy efficiency while satisfying its delay QoS requirements. The packet arrival at the user’s terminal
is assumed to have a Poisson distribution with an average rate of λk. The user transmits the arriving packets at a
rate Rk (bps) and with a transmit power equal to pk Watts. The user keeps retransmitting a packet until the packet is
received error-free. The incoming packets are assumed to be stored in a queue and transmitted in a first-in-first-out
(FIFO) fashion. The combination of user k’s queue and wireless link can be modeled as an M/G/1 queue. Now, let
Wk represent the total packet delay for user k including queueing and transmission delays. We require the average
delay for user k’s packets to be less than or equal to Dk. Hence, the proposed joint power and rate control can be
expressed as the following constrained maximization:
max
pk,Rk
uk s.t. W¯k ≤ Dk , (22)
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It is shown in [46] that the delay constraint of a user translates into a lower bound for the user’s output SIR.
Furthermore, any combination of transmit power pk and transmission rate Rk such that γk = γ∗ and Rk ≥ Ω∗k
maximizes user k’s utility. Ω∗k here corresponds to the rate at which user k meets its delay constraint with equality
when γk = γ∗ and is given by
Ω∗k =
(
M
Dk
) 1 +Dkλk +
√
1 +D2kλ
2
k + 2(1− f(γ
∗))Dkλk
2f(γ∗)
. (23)
This means that the joint power and rate control game has infinitely many Nash equilibria. However, the equilibrium
corresponding to Rk = Ω∗k with γk = γ∗ is the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. Using this framework, the loss in
energy efficiency and network capacity due to the presence of delay-sensitive users can be quantified. In particular,
the QoS constraints of a user can be translated into a “size” for the user which is an indication of the amount of
resources consumed by the user. For a matched filter receiver, at Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium, the “size” of
user k is given by
Φ∗k =
1
1 + B
Ω∗
k
γ∗
, (24)
where B is the system bandwidth. The necessary and sufficient condition for this equilibrium to be feasible is given
by
K∑
k=1
Φ∗k < 1. (25)
Furthermore, the utility of user ℓ at the Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium is given by (see [46])
uℓ =
(
Bhℓf(γ
∗)
σ2γ∗
)
1−
∑K
i=1Φ
∗
i
1− Φ∗ℓ
, (26)
where, as before, σ2 is the noise power (including other-cell interference) and hℓ is the channel gain. Equation
(26) together with (25) allows us to quantify the tradeoffs among delay, energy efficiency, throughput and network
capacity for the multiuser, competitive setting under consideration.
Fig. 6 shows the user size, network capacity, transmission rate, and total goodput (i.e., reliable throughput) as
a function of normalized delay for different source rates.4 The network capacity refers to the maximum number
of users that can be admitted into the network assuming that all the users have the same QoS requirements (i.e.,
the same size). The transmission rate and goodput are normalized by the system bandwidth. The total goodput
is obtained by multiplying the source rate by the total number of users. As the QoS requirements become more
stringent (i.e., a higher source rate and/or a smaller delay), the size of the user increases which means more
4The delay is normalized by the inverse of the system bandwidth.
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Fig. 6. User size, network capacity, normalized transmission rate, and normalized total goodput as a function of normalized delay for
different source rates (B = 5MHz).
network resources are required to accommodate the user. This results in a reduction in the network capacity. It is
also observed from the figure that when the delay constraint is loose, the total goodput is almost independent of
the source rate. This is because a lower source rate is compensated by the fact that more users can be admitted into
the network. On the other hand, when the delay constraint in tight, the total goodput is higher for larger source
rates.
The effect of modulation on energy efficiency has also been studied in [47] in a similar manner. In particular, a
non-cooperative game is proposed in which each user can choose its modulation level (e.g., 16-QAM or 64-QAM) as
well as its transmit power and transmission rate. It is shown that, in terms of energy efficiency, it is best for a user to
choose the lowest modulation level that can satisfy the user’s delay QoS constraints. This strategy is again different
from the one obtained when maximizing simply throughput. Incorporating the choice of the modulation order into
utility maximization allows us to trade off energy efficiency with spectral efficiency. For the same bandwidth and
symbol rate, as a user switches to a higher-order modulation, the spectral efficiency for the user improves but its
energy efficiency degrades (see [47] for more details).
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V. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The objective of this article has been to provide an overview of game-theoretic approaches to energy-efficient
resource allocation in wireless data networks. We have shown that game theory can be used as a unifying framework
for studying radio resource management in wireless CDMA networks. Focusing on multiple-access networks, we
have presented a number of non-cooperative power control games in which each user seeks to maximize its own
utility while satisfying its QoS requirements. The utility function considered here measures the number of reliable
bits transmitted per joule of energy consumed, and is particularly useful for energy-constrained networks. The actions
open to each user in trying to maximize its utility have been at least the choice of transmit power and, depending
on the situation, each user may also be able to choose its transmission rate, modulation scheme, uplink receiver
type, multiantenna processing algorithm, or carrier allocation strategy. The best-response strategies and the Nash
equilibrium solutions for these power control games have been presented. Using this game-theoretic approach,
the effects of power control, rate control, modulation, temporal and spatial signal processing, carrier allocation
strategy and delay QoS constraints on energy efficiency and network capacity have been studied and quantified
in a competitive multiuser setting. In addition, it is seen that in many cases, energy-efficient resource allocation
algorithms are not spectrally efficient. Hence, there is a clear tradeoff between maximizing energy efficiency and
maximizing spectral efficiency.
The game-theoretic framework discussed in the article is also very suitable for studying cross-layer resource
allocation in wireless ad hoc networks and wireless local area networks (WLANs). Non-cooperative games are
very useful for analyzing ad hoc networks due to the decentralized nature of the communication (see [1]). Energy
efficiency is also very important in wireless ad hoc networks. However, the main challenge is to define an appropriate
utility function that captures the multihop nature of the communication in ad hoc networks but at same time is
tractable analytically. In WLANs, users communicate to the access point through random access schemes. A user
must first compete with other users in the network to capture the channel. Once the channel is captured, the user
will have the entire bandwidth to itself for packet transmission. If a user is too aggressive in its attempts for
capturing the channel, it will cause many collisions which will degrade the user’s throughput. On the other hand, if
the user is too passive, it will not have access to the channel very often and, hence, its throughput degrades. Game
theory is an effective tool for modeling the users’ interactions in such a system (see, for example, [48] and [49]).
Other possible areas for further research are more extensive performance comparison between non-cooperative and
cooperative resource allocation schemes, and inclusion of channel variation into the utility maximization.
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